Lori Roth v. City of Hermitage by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-8-2017 
Lori Roth v. City of Hermitage 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"Lori Roth v. City of Hermitage" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 883. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/883 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










 CITY OF HERMITAGE; BRIAN E. BLAIR, Hermitage Chief of Police; 
 ERIC JEWELL, Deputy Chief-Investigations  
 a/k/a Paul Eric Jewell; ADAM PICCIRILLO, Deputy Chief-Operations; 
 DETECTIVE TODD SAYLOR, DETECTIVE JOHN MILLER; 
 CORPORAL DANIEL K. YOUNG; OFFICE PHILLIP SCIARETTA; 
 OFFICE CHAD NYCH; OFFICER CHRISTOPHER MORSE; 
 J. BRADLEY MCGONIGLE, Mercer County Coroner & 
 Medical Examiner 
 
    J. Bradley McGonigle, Mercer County  
    Coroner & Medical Examiner, 
            Appellant  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 2-16-cv-00410) 
District Judge:  Hon. Cathy Bissoon 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 6, 2017 
 
Before:   CHAGARES, JORDAN, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges. 
 













JORDAN, Circuit Judge 
 This case involves allegations of a complicated conspiracy, but the issue before us 
on appeal is relatively simple – whether the District Court erred in failing to consider a 
qualified immunity defense before dismissing the Plaintiff’s claims on the merits without 
prejudice.  We conclude there was error and therefore will vacate and remand.   
I. BACKGROUND 
Michael Roth was, tragically, found dead in a friend’s swimming pool after he 
attended a party at the friend’s home.  Lori Roth, Michael’s mother and the administratrix 
of his estate, argues that police insufficiently investigated the circumstances of his death.  
At the time of Michael’s death, Appellant J. Bradley McGonigle was the Mercer County 
Coroner and Medical Examiner.  He directed Dr. Eric Vey to conduct an autopsy on 
Michael.  The autopsy results were “consistent with drowning” and suggested that 
Michael “sustained a neck fracture” before drowning.  (App. at 9.)  After Dr. Vey issued 
his report, which said that the drowning occurred as a result of a “mishap,” McGonigle 
did not conduct a further inquest into how or when Michael died, as Roth claims he was 
required to do.  (App. at 9-10.)  
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Roth filed this lawsuit against the City of Hermitage, several Hermitage police 
officers, and other city officials (collectively the “City Defendants”), as well as against 
McGonigle.  She claims, as summarized by the District Court, that the lack of an 
adequate investigation violated “her federal constitutional right of access to the courts” 
and “deprived [her] of the opportunity to seek meaningful judicial redress for her son’s 
death in the form of a state-court wrongful death action.”  (App. at 10.)  And yet Roth 
litigated to a successful conclusion a wrongful death action against the family that hosted 
the ill-fated pool party, obtaining a more than $100,000 settlement.  She is also pursuing 
a second wrongful death action against 21 individuals who were present at the party that 
night.   
 In this case, the City Defendants and McGonigle filed separate motions to dismiss.  
McGonigle argued that Roth failed to state a claim against him and also that he was 
entitled to qualified immunity.  The District Court granted the motions to dismiss, 
concluding that Roth had not stated a cognizable denial of access to the courts claim 
because she had not alleged that there was an effort to cover-up or conceal information.  
Despite that conclusion, the Court also stated that, “to the extent that [Roth] claims that 
she cannot meaningfully litigate her pending state court action, that claim is premature.”  
(App. at 16.)  So the Court granted dismissal without prejudice and stayed the action 
“pending the resolution of [Roth’s] state court action.”  (App. at 17.)  Specifically with 
regard to the claims against McGonigle, the District Court noted that the claims would be 
dismissed without prejudice because “there is no allegation that Defendant McGonigle 
(or any other Defendant) engaged in active concealment or destruction of evidence that 
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could give rise to a viable denial of access to the courts claim.”  (App. at 20.)  The 
District Court was silent with regard to McGonigle’s qualified immunity defense.   
McGonigle filed this timely appeal, arguing that the District Court erred by failing 
to consider his request for qualified immunity.  
II. DISCUSSION1   
We asked the parties to brief whether we have jurisdiction despite the District 
Court’s entry of a stay.  We conclude that we do have jurisdiction and that the District 
Court erred by not considering McGonigle’s qualified immunity defense.  
An officer’s entitlement to dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity is not 
merely based on “the individual’s desire to avoid the personal costs and aggravations of 
presenting a defense.”  In re Montgomery Cty., 215 F.3d 367, 374 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Instead, “the right not to stand trial is based on far broader concerns for avoiding the 
social costs of the underlying litigation, and for ensuring and preserving the effectiveness 
of government.”  Id. at 374-75.  Accordingly, an order implicating a qualified immunity 
defense, even implicitly, can be appealable.  Id. at 374 (holding that “we have 
interlocutory jurisdiction to review an implied denial” of qualified immunity).   
In this case, the District Court effectively (if temporarily) denied qualified 
immunity because it ruled that additional factual development was needed in state court 
before the Court could fully resolve the merits of Roth’s claim.  Therefore, by implication 
it concluded that qualified immunity could not be granted on the current record, and that 
decision was immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.  George v. 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
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Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 571 (3d Cir. 2013).  That is true even though the District Court’s 
stay order does not immediately subject McGonigle to “the personal costs and 
aggravations of presenting a defense.”  In re Montgomery Cty., 215 F.3d at 374.  The 
order still subjects him to the continued threat of future litigation.  Accordingly, we have 
jurisdiction.2   
The District Court was required to rule on the qualified immunity defense before 
dismissing without prejudice and granting a stay.  We have emphasized that “a district 
court must avail itself of the procedures available under the Federal Rules to facilitate an 
early resolution of the qualified immunity issue.”  Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 
300 (3d Cir. 2006).  Or, in other words, “the trial court must exercise its discretion in a 
way that protects the substance of the qualified immunity defense ... so that officials are 
not subjected to unnecessary and burdensome discovery or trial proceedings.”  Id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597-98 (1998)).  
Because the District Court did not consider qualified immunity, McGonigle did not 
benefit from “the substance of the qualified immunity defense,” id. (quoting Crawford-
El, 523 U.S. at 597), and remains potentially liable in a future suit.   
                                              
2 Roth argues that the stay order is not appealable since it was a procedural stay 
and did not “require all or an essential part of the federal suit to be litigated in a state 
forum.”  Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Moses H. Cone 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10 n.11 (1983)).  But McGonigle is 
not challenging the decision to issue a stay itself; he is challenging the decision to enter a 
stay without first considering the question of qualified immunity.  And the implicit denial 
of qualified immunity is immediately appealable, even if the decision to enter a stay is 
not.   
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Failing to consider the qualified immunity defense before dismissing without 
prejudice on the merits was error because the District Court failed to resolve a “motion 
asserting qualified immunity … at the earliest possible stage in the litigation.”  Id. at 302; 
see also James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012) (recognizing 
that we had previously remanded a case to the district court “for an explanation as to why 
it denied qualified immunity” when the court rejected a motion to dismiss without 
discussing qualified immunity).  Accordingly, we will remand to allow the District Court 
to consider whether the claims against McGonigle should be dismissed with prejudice on 
the basis of qualified immunity. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the order of dismissal and remand to 
allow the District Court to consider McGonigle’s qualified immunity defense. 
